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With the Derg's overthrow in 1991, Eritrea embarked on the construction of a new state.
New economic institutions were created, and considerable reform undertaken. Problems
in co-ordinating reform and reconstruction were largely avoided, mainly because of the
institutional ‘clean slate’ facing the country at independence and the high level of social
solidarity and other social capital that characterize the country. A well-defined
economic strategy, and careful use of aid, promised higher returns to investment (and
fewer unsustainable projects) than found elsewhere in SSA. By the start of 1998, the
country had achieved much in a short time. The 1998-2000 war threatens to undermine
this achievement. The ashes of the war that ended in 1991 have reignited in a surprising
and different way, and the fall out from the war endangers progress in development and
democratization.
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1 Introduction
Throughout their recent history the Eritrean people have struggled for independence,
first against Italy—which established the colony of Eritrea in 1890—and then against
the Ethiopian monarchy, and later the military dictatorship of the Derg (Pateman 1990).
De facto independence and the end of the 30 year-liberation war was achieved in May
1991 with the defeat of the Derg by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in
alliance with Ethiopia's rebel forces. After a referendum in which the electorate voted
overwhelmingly for formal independence, this was duly declared on 23 May 1993.
Eritrea thereby honoured its ancient name: Medri Geez—the land of the free.
In addition to resettling returnees and helping communities rebuild their livelihoods (the
subject of Kibreab 2001), this new state was faced with two additional and urgent
agendas. First, transforming the political apparatus of the national liberation struggle
into a set of political institutions suitable to peacetime politics. Second, creating the
economic strategies and institutions necessary to transform the Derg's economic legacy.
To create a true development state—one that is democratically accountable and capable
of designing and implementing broad-based development—requires the achievement of
both agendas (see Addison 2001a and 2001b). Accordingly, both sets of issues are
d i s c u s s e di nt h i sp a p e r ,i ns e c t i o n s2a n d3r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Considerable progress was made in the first years of independence but in May 1998 a
border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia escalated into a war that continued until
the cease-fire of June 2000. Both countries have mobilized considerable human and
material resources for the war. In terms of the numbers of soldiers involved, military
casualties, and numbers displaced, the Eritrea-Ethiopia war was the largest conflict of
1999. The economic roots of the war as well as its social and economic impact are
discussed in section 4. We conclude, in section 5, by noting the dangers that the 1998-
2000 war poses to the creation of a development state in both Eritrea and Ethiopia.
2 Building political institutions
Drafting a constitution was one of the first political tasks after independence. A
constitutional commission was formed in 1994, comprising representatives from each
ethnic group and the country's large diaspora. After wide-ranging consultations (in
which more than half a million people participated) the 1995 ‘Constitutional Proposals
for Public Debate’ set out an explicit and clear goal (CCE 1995a: 10):
We Eritreans are engaged in creating our own government for the first
time in our history. ... If we can create a strong government that is free
from corruption and manipulation by foreign interests, and that has as its
disposal effective institutions, it will be a decisive instrument in our
nation building and development efforts.
Furthermore, it was stressed that the Eritrean political system '... ought to be based on
the principles of nationalism [national unity and development], secularism [separation
of religion from government] and democracy [ensure equal participation of all members
of Eritrean society without any exception]' (CCE 1995a: 7). The Constitution duly came
into effect on 24 May 1997.2
The Constitutional Commission was well aware that considerable institutional
investment was necessary to realize constitutional goals (CCE 1995a: 12). Here, we
discuss four critical issues: the construction of political parties (and the ethnic
dimension); decentralization; the choice of the electoral system; and the status of
women.
Under the Constitution the National Assembly is elected every five years, and in turn
the assembly elects the president for a five-year term (maximum two terms). However,
the first national elections—originally scheduled for 1997—were delayed until 1998,
and then postponed indefinitely when war broke out. For the present, the 150-seat
Transitional National Assembly consists of 75 members from the central council of the
People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)—which was formed out of the EPLF
and elements of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—and 75 non-PFDJ members,
including representatives of the diaspora. The PFDJ remains the only legal party
(although the PFDJ prefers to describe itself as a movement) and political-party
legislation is still pending. Given its resources and high profile, the PFDJ will probably
win the eventual elections. Indeed, President Isaias Afewerki has concluded that the
opposition will be slow to develop (Financial Times, 18 January 1996: 13):
If you're looking in terms of 5 or 10 years, you will be disappointed.
Given our circumstances, the Front will continue to be dominant for
several years to come.
There are nine ethnic groups with two of them (the Tigray and the Tigre) accounting for
up to 90 per cent of the population. The peaceful management and reconciliation of
ethnic differences is critical to stability and continuity in new states—a point on which
the Constitutional Commission was very clear (CCE 1995a: 15):
Building democracy has to follow the path of nation-building in which
sub-nationalism and its concomitant religious, tribal and sectarian
tendencies are not given any chance to grow, but rather, unity and
stability are maintained. What we need is a participatory democracy that
is based on, and reinforces, national consensus, one that serves the
purpose of developing a stable political system as opposed to one that
institutionalised exclusion.
The formation of political parties along ethnic or religious lines is therefore prohibited.
This does of course conflict with what is normally seen as a basic human right—the
right of assembly. Hence, Eritrea has not yet ratified the United Nations Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. However, Article 19 of the Constitution, on ‘Freedom of
Conscience, Religion, Expression of Opinion, Movement, Assembly and Organization’
includes what are normally considered to be central human rights, including guarantees
for freedom of opinion and for the work of political parties.
Common hardship during the liberation war strengthened the bond between different
ethnic groups—an important piece of social capital for the new state (see Kibreab
2001). Nevertheless, the ban on forming political parties along ethnic lines indicates that
ethnicity is a sensitive political issue. Therefore in order to democratically resolve
ethnic grievances as well as protect minorities, other types of formal institution (as well
as informal practices) need to evolve.3
A related issue is decentralization. Eritrea's population is much smaller than Ethiopia's
(3.4 million and 58.2 million, respectively), its ethnic groups are less regionally
concentrated, and Ethiopia has the potential for more serious ethnic tension (see
Addison 2001b). Therefore a federal political structure, of the kind adopted in Ethiopia,
has not been adopted in Eritrea (on Ethiopia's decentralization, see Bevan 2001).
However, decentralization is certainly important since local administrations can respond
more readily to local needs. But local capacities are underdeveloped and lack funding in
Eritrea. Therefore although the constitutional proposal stressed the need for
decentralization within the context of a unitary state, it also concluded that
decentralization cannot be created or accelerated by policy decisions alone, but will
instead evolve over time as regions, local economies and cultures transform themselves
(CCE 1995a: 28, and CCE 1995b: 27).
The choice of electoral system is a crucial decision in creating a democracy (see for
example Lijphart 1991 and Hydén 1993). No decision has yet been reached, although
work on electoral law has started. A country aiming to achieve the widest democracy
possible would tend to favour proportional representation. On the other hand, a
plurality/majority system might be favoured when major economic reform is necessary.
This is more likely to deliver a clear majority for one party, enabling it to carry through
reforms more readily than the fragile coalitions sometimes (but not always) associated
with proportional representation. Therefore Eritreans will have to carefully weigh the
relative merits of each system.
Finally, there is the issue of women's status in Eritrean society. Twenty-one members of
the Constitutional Commission were women, 40 per cent of participants in the
commission's consultation meetings were women, and thirty per cent of seats in the
National Assembly are reserved for women. Hence, the political voice of women is
considerable. Nevertheless, discrimination against women in community life remains
widespread; this reduces their access to land and employment despite formal equality in
law (Kibreab 2001 discusses the implications for women's livelihoods).
In summary, Eritrea has participatory political processes, the state enjoys a large
measure of legitimacy, and women have made some gains. However, the legal
framework for the formation and finance of political parties is still nascent, the first
national elections are still pending, and the media remains largely government
controlled. Therefore unlike Mozambique—which has had two national elections since
the end of its war in 1992—Eritrea is yet to consolidate itself as a multi-party system
despite the leadership's stated commitment to democracy. This remains an important
challenge.
3 Economic institutions and strategies
Eritrea's economy was devastated by 30 years of war and the Derg's economic policies.
Assets were nationalized and the Derg ran a highly centralized economy from Addis
Ababa; administrative directives, rather than price incentives, were intended to allocate
resources under a command economy much influenced by the Soviet system (see
Hansson 1995). As a result, the economy was extremely weak by the time Eritrean
forces took control of the country in 1991. Poverty was widespread and human
development was limited; UNDP's Human Development Indicator ranks Eritrea at 167th4
out of 174 countries—marginally ahead of Ethiopia—but well below the SSA average
(UNDP 1999).
The early years saw efforts to build a consensus on economic strategy alongside the
process of political consultation. In 1991, the University of Asmara hosted a conference
on economic policy (see Gebre Hiwet Tesfagioris 1993). Agreement was reached on the
need for a mix of private and public ownership, regional economic co-operation, and
investment to diversify through tourism, financial services and manufacturing. These
goals were incorporated into the ‘Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme for Eritrea’
(RRPE) which was launched shortly after the Asmara meeting (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 1995: 3) followed by the more detailed ‘Macro-Policy’ document in 1994 (GSE
1994: 10).
Eritrea has consistently followed a strategy in which interaction with the rest of the
world—through foreign investment, international borrowing, and aid—is very
cautiously managed. But the country's definition of national ‘self-sufficiency’ does not
imply autarchy. In the field of food security, for instance, the stated objective is to reach
self-sufficiency within five years but not through domestic food production—
impossible since the country is in the Sahelian rainfall zone—but by developing export
sectors to pay for food imports.1 Likewise in investment goods, where the country has
an obvious comparative disadvantage given its low level of development. Historically,
Eritrea's location and access to the markets of the Middle East and SSA has favoured it
as a trading nation.
Tourism and fisheries together with the exploitation of gold, high-quality marble and
offshore oil deposits, require considerable resources. To this end, direct foreign
investment (DFI) is actively sought when it meets national development goals. But
policymakers can only evaluate the relative merits of DFI projects when those national
goals are well specified, which in turn requires a clear economic strategy. Eritrea is
better placed in this respect than many other SSA countries where economic strategy
and DFI policy are underdeveloped (see Castel-Branco, et al. 2001 on weaknesses in
Mozambique's DFI strategy). Foreign investment was negligible until 1995, but rose
strongly over 1996 to 1998 when it averaged 5.5 per cent of GDP—about the same as
Mozambique's ratio for 1998 (see Table 1). However, foreign interest in privatized
enterprises has to date been limited (see section 4).
At independence, Eritrea had no external debt—Ethiopia inherited all the Derg's
external debts. Eritrea is the only country in this study that is not in the 'Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC) category. Eritrea therefore embarked on its
reconstruction with a major advantage over Ethiopia, as well as other poor war-torn
countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, where external service has been a
constraint on recovery (see Addison and Ndikumana 2001). The government has been
cautious in its borrowing since independence, and the stock of external public debt
(disbursed) amounts to only 9.1 per cent of GNP (see Table 2). Debt service was less
than 1 per cent of Eritrea's total exports of goods and services in 1997 (IMF 1998: 76)
1 The production of staple foods undergoes major fluctuations depending on the weather. The volume
of staple foods produced in 1994—the best year in the 1990s—was nearly three times as great as in
the drought year of 1996 (IMF 1998: 50).5
This prudent borrowing strategy reflects Eritrea's relationship with the donor
community, to which we now turn.
3.1 Foreign aid
Eritrea's attempt to avoid aid dependence, and to set the terms of the donor-recipient
relationship—the government prefers the term 'partners in development' and emphasizes
national ‘ownership’ of development projects—is of considerable interest given the aid
dependence of much of SSA. The Government has confined aid to sectors such as
infrastructure that are necessary to strengthen the economy to a point at which external
trade and foreign investment, and not aid, become the main sources of foreign exchange
and capital inflow. Large-scale balance of payments support (such as an IMF facility)
has not been sought despite Eritrea's eligibility. Eritrea has borrowed only US$ 125.4
million from the World Bank; in comparison Ethiopia has borrowed US$ 3,036.3
million from the Bank, whereas Mozambique has borrowed US$ 1,812.0 million (World
Bank 1999). In 1996, Eritrea borrowed less from the World Bank's International
Development Association (IDA) than from Arab development banks (IMF 1997: 69).
Foreign assistance (as measured by net official transfers) averaged only 10 per cent of
GNP in the mid-1990s, and was around 5 per cent in 1997 (Table 2) which is below the
average for low-income SSA countries. Indeed, remittances by the diaspora were more
important; private transfers have exceeded official transfers in every year since
independence: private transfers amounted to US$ 384.4 million in 1997, whereas
official transfers were only US$ 41.4 million (down from an average of about US$ 75
million per year since independence) (see Table 2).
Eritrea's caution reflects a desire to avoid donor policy conditionality, which is seen as
incompatible with national independence. The civil service has been downsized,
taxation reformed, and trade and exchange controls liberalized—all policies that are
normally associated with BWI conditionality—but the government emphasizes that this
was its decision, not one imposed upon it (see section 4).2 Before the outbreak of war in
May 1998, the BWIs would almost certainly have wanted to lend more since Eritrea's
government displays precisely the characteristic of policy 'ownership' that donors now
emphasize as critical to aid's success (see for instance World Bank 1998a). But the
Eritrea-Ethiopia war has now put donors in an awkward position with respect to both
countries (more so in the case of Ethiopia, where donor lending is much larger).
The coherence of the government's strategy clearly facilitated reconstruction from 1991
onwards. The contrast with the fragmentation of policy-making and the lack of basic
development strategy in, for example, Angola and Guinea-Bissau is striking (see the
Aguilar 2001 and Kovsted and Tarp 1999). Yet, this strategy has entailed costs.
Emphasis on ‘ownership’ of development projects has led to a reluctance to use foreign
expatriates—a constraint on development given the country's shortage of professional
skills (see Kibreab 2001 on this issue). There is a thin top layer of highly qualified staff
in government, but the quality of skills quickly tails off as one moves down the
2 The government has accepted IMF technical assistance in the establishment of the Bank of Eritrea
(IMF 1998: 4).6
organizational pyramid. Aid, if wisely used, could ease the skill constraint thereby
reinforcing the attainment of Eritrea's national goals.
Moreover, aid could do much more in the education, health and sanitation and water
sectors—all are resource-intensive and all are critical to raising Eritrea's dismal human
development indicators. Hence, the low educational level—adult illiteracy is 80 per cent
(and 90 per cent for females)—is a major constraint in both the private and public
sectors (World Bank 1996: 31). Foreign assistance to education could therefore have
high returns. The government's Macro-Policy document declares that seven years of
primary education should be available to all (GSE 1994: 39). However, this is a very
demanding objective given the low enrolment rates at present; only 47.4 per cent for
primary schooling, and 22.4 and 13.7 per cent for junior secondary school and
secondary school, respectively (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995: 12). Accelerating
enrolment, and providing quality education, require large capital and recurrent
expenditures. Eritrea managed to raise spending on education from 1.4 per cent of GNP
in 1992 to 3 per cent in 1995 and 1996 (World Bank 1998b), and this helped to raise the
primary enrolment rate to around 54 per cent before the start of the war. But absolute
levels of education spending remain low since Eritrea faces a fiscal constraint that is
probably as severe as Ethiopia's (see Bigsten 1999). Aid to the education sector could
therefore do much to help Eritrea rapidly close its educational gap—with temporary use
of expatriates to help train nationals—without compromising the goal of national self-
reliance. Moreover, foreign assistance to basic education could facilitate
democratization, in particular the process of consensus-building which is a feature of
Eritrean politics (section 2). The dissemination of information and public debate cannot
work effectively when 80 per cent of adults are illiterate.
Aid could have similarly high returns in the health sector. Eritrea has embarked on an
ambitious programme to build new health institutions and rehabilitate existing ones as
well as to upgrade medical staff who received their basic education at the front during
the liberation war. Some 70 health stations and 40 health centres were built between
1992 and 1996. The government is also encouraging private sector investment in health
care as a complement to direct public provision. Public spending on health rose from 1.4
per cent of GNP in 1992 to 3 per cent in 1995 and 1996 (World Bank 1998b: 4). Yet the
resource constraint remains large and therefore absolute spending is low—only US$ 1.6
in 1994 (although up from US$ 0.7 in 1992)—and aid to the health sector could raise
this substantially. This is also the case in the water and sanitation sectors. Potable water
is a major input into health, particularly child health and Eritrea's high infant mortality
rate is in part the consequence of water-borne disease which must be eliminated through
greater investment in water and sanitation infrastructure.
4 Economic transition prior to may 1998
Like the other countries in this study, Eritrea has had to reform the economy alongside
reconstruction; specifically, to transform the policy legacy of the Derg with its emphasis
on state planning and state ownership. The 1990s saw trade and exchange reform, as
well as fiscal reform, privatization, regulatory decontrol, and other sector reforms. But
unlike Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, or Mozambique, the Government of Eritrea
had to create completely new economic institutions from scratch. These include a
central bank, a system of public accounts, a national statistical office and (in November7
1997) a currency. Starting with an institutional 'clean slate' has its advantages;
opponents of reform in long-standing but ineffective institutions are a major constraint
in countries such as Angola and Guinea-Bissau (see Aguilar 2001 on Angola for
example). But institutional creation does stretch the weak capacities of a state that is
short of professional skills.
4.1 Trade reform, currency arrangements, and financial reform
Nearly all quantitative restrictions on imports were eliminated over 1993-96 in order to
facilitate reconstruction—which is very import-intensive—and to increase efficiency in
the domestic economy. At independence Eritrea inherited very high tariff rates.
However, a tariff reform in October 1994 reduced tariff rates to 2-3 per cent on imports
of agricultural and capital goods and 5-50 per cent on intermediate goods and most
manufactured goods. Tariffs on imports of luxury consumer goods remain in the range
of 80 to 200 per cent (IMF 1998: 33). Public sector export and import agencies have
been closed and the private sector can import and export directly (World Bank 1998b).
These measures, together with the abolition of export taxes, have increased export
incentives. The administration of foreign exchange has also been liberalized in order to
promote Eritrea's role as a centre of regional trade and finance. In 1996, the Bank of
Eritrea announced its intention to phase out all exchange controls (Bank of Eritrea
1996).3 Up to 1998 the government had also liberalized most of the restrictions on
foreign trade and investments (World Bank 1999: 3).
The Ethiopian birr continued to circulate in Eritrea after independence. The birr was
devalued in September 1992 from 2.07 birr per US dollar (an exchange rate that had
lasted since the early 1970s) to 5.00 birr per US dollar. This was a major step in
correcting the currency's long-standing overvaluation which had undermined exports,
and was therefore important to recovery in both countries. In May 1993 the Ethiopian
government introduced a foreign-exchange auction system, and the exchange rate
became largely market-determined (see Hansson 1995: 114, and Addison and
Alemayehu Geda 2001).
The level of bilateral trade favoured the continuation of monetary union after
independence. However, there were also two disadvantages for Eritrea. First, since the
birr was issued solely by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), Eritrea had no
independent monetary policy. Close relations between the two governments facilitated
co-operation between their central banks but, more fundamentally, at any given moment
the interest rate set by the NBE was not necessarily appropriate to business conditions in
Eritrea. Second, without its own currency, Eritrea had no seignorage revenue—an
important consideration given the need to finance reconstruction and development
spending.
3 Under the 1996 reform, no declaration of exchange holdings is required when passing across the
Eritrean border, exporters may retain their entire foreign exchange earnings, and both the negative list
and restrictions on the transfer of profits dividends, patent rights and capital were dismantled. (Bank
of Eritrea 1996).8
Lack of administrative and policy experience in the Bank of Eritrea, which was
established by temporary proclamation in 1993, precluded the early introduction of a
national currency. But four years later the Bank of Eritrea had built up enough capacity
to issue and manage a currency as well to conduct an independent monetary policy. The
enactment of the ‘Bank of Eritrea Proclamation and the Financial Institutions
Proclamation’ in April 1997 provided the bank with the necessary powers. And on 22
November 1997, a national currency, the nafka, was introduced thereby ending the
monetary union with Ethiopia. As it turned out, this was one factor in the deterioration
of political relations between the two countries over 1997-98, and the descent into war
(see section 5).
As in other formerly state-socialist countries such as Ethiopia and Mozambique, the
development of the financial system is important to reconstruction and longer-term
development. Financial institutions are state owned with the exception of the Housing
and Commerce Bank of Eritrea (HBCE) which is owned by the PFDJ (on the troubling
implications of bank ownership by political parties see Addison 2001a). The
Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBE) accounts for 88 per cent of total bank assets and 87
per cent of total deposits (IMF 1998: 11). CBE has excess liquidity since the inflow of
deposits (it is dominant in the deposit market) exceeds its lending (also the case with the
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia—see Addison and Alemayehu Geda 2001). During the
currency union, CBE's excess liquidity was deposited with the Bank of Eritrea, which
then used it to advance credits to fund the fiscal deficit (IMF 1997: 15). A range of
financial institutions and instruments—for example an inter-bank market and a treasury-
bill market—must be created to absorb the excess liquidity, improve the financial-
system's efficiency, and enable the Bank of Eritrea to deploy indirect methods of
monetary control. Major tasks of financial development therefore remain.
Statements by the government and the Bank of Eritrea seem to favour foreign
investment in the financial sector—the strategy therefore appears to be closer to that of
Mozambique than of Ethiopia, where foreign ownership of financial institutions is
prohibited (see Castel-Branco, et al. 2001 and Addison and Alemayehu Geda 2001).
Certainly, Eritrea's ambition to create a regional financial centre will require foreign
investment in banking, perhaps necessitating the privatization of CBE. But little has
happened yet, and as a new country Eritrea has had to concentrate its efforts on
establishing a central bank as a first priority.
4.2 Deregulation and privatization
A number of measures have been introduced to encourage private-sector development.
Tax reform has reduced the marginal rate on a wide range of incomes, including those
from business and trade, from 85 to 38 per cent. The process of starting a small business
has been simplified through the establishment of a new licence office (EIU 1995: 29).
As with the other countries in this study, it is vital to establish legal institutions such as
commercial law to protect private property rights and thereby encourage private
investment. The transition economies of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
demonstrate how the neglect of early institutional investment can distort the private-
sector's subsequent development (see Stiglitz 1999). This lesson is highly relevant to
Africa's transition economies. Fortunately, through its more or less immediate
introduction and implementation of a thorough reform program, Eritrea appears to be
much better placed to develop such institutions than much of formerly state-socialist
Africa.9
Privatization began with small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Some
700 small-scale shops were sold by the end of 1993. A national agency to supervise the
privatization of large SOEs was established in December 1995. In contrast to Ethiopia,
the Government of Eritrea's economic strategy appears to place greater emphasis on
privatization (on Ethiopia, see Hansson 1995: 121). Therefore in 1997 it was decided to
privatize all 39 SOEs in manufacturing (GSE 1995). However, the privatization of large
SOEs has fallen behind target and only 11 enterprises had been privatized by mid-1998
(IMF 1998: 24). Foreign interest in buying SOEs was limited before May 1998—two
state farms failed to sell, for example—and declined further with the onset of war. By
May 1998 only 25 per cent of the SOEs slated for privatization had been sold (World
Bank 1998b). As an interim measure, the government decided that SOEs should be run
by autonomous boards and should operate on commercial conditions—thereby
increasing management accountability and making the business more attractive if
eventually privatized.
A comparison with Mozambique is instructive (see Castel-Branco, et al. 2001). As in
Mozambique, the privatization of small SOEs created new livelihoods for ex-
combatants and returning refugees. Eritrea's privatization process has been better
organized—Mozambique's early privatizations were especially chaotic—and although
we have no evidence on the transparency of Eritrea's privatization process, the low level
of corruption in the state is a good augury (many of Mozambique's privatizations were
highly non-transparent). But, Mozambique has one very strong advantage over Eritrea;
a sustained peace has increased the country's attractiveness to foreign investors.
It is also important to introduce competition laws and regulation in the public interest in
order to avoid the creation of new private monopolies out of old SOE monopolies
(Hansson 1995: 121, Stiglitz 1999: 5). In this regard, it is unclear why the government
granted the Gash Cigarettes Company (the only company fully purchased by a private
investor) a monopoly over the domestic market for a period of 13 years. The company is
protected by foreign competition by a very high import tariff, although it intends to
export. The export revenues and positive externalities from the investment (skill
enhancement and technology) may justify the loss of consumer welfare. However, such
arguments for offering incentives to foreign investors must be carefully evaluated. In
general, and with the exception of Gash, the government has avoided granting large
incentives to DFI.
4.3 Fiscal reform
Over 1993-96, the government undertook major reconstruction expenditures. These
included the resettlement of refugees, the demobilization of 54,000 ex-combatants,
support to martyrs' families, and infrastructure reconstruction (see Kibreab 2001 on
resettlement). Some 10,000 civil servants were also retrenched and paid severance
wages (resulting in a 30 per cent reduction in the public sector workforce). Public
spending on education and health grew significantly. As a result, and as is usual in
reconstructing economies, expenditures substantially exceeded revenues in the
immediate post-war years; the fiscal deficit before grants averaged 25 per cent of GNP
over 1993-96, and 12.5 per cent after grants (IMF 1998: 63). However, the fiscal deficit
after grants was then sharply reduced—to 5.5 per cent in 1997—mainly by cutting the
fiscal deficit before grants to 10.4 per cent. The development of the fiscal position over10
the 1990s is shown in Table 3. Public expenditure increased sharply in 1998—the result
of the rise in military spending with the outbreak of war—and the resulting sharp
deterioration in the fiscal position (an issue we return to in section 5).
Revenues improved as a result of the overhaul of the tax and customs structure in 1994
and a rise in the tax base following the resumption of economic growth together with
higher receipts from port fees and charges.4 The latter also reflected the rapid growth in
Eritrean and Ethiopian bilateral and external trade (itself a feature of reconstruction)
until the 1998 war. Port fees and charges rose from ERN 224.5 million in 1993 to ERN
444.3 million in 1997—22.6 per cent of total public revenues excluding external grants
(IMF 1998: 62).5 Eritrea's high level of social capital has benefited revenue
mobilization in two ways. First, it has not experienced the major problem of corruption
that has afflicted the revenue and customs services of many SSA countries;
Mozambique for example had to put out its customs service to private tender following
a major shortfall in customs revenue (see Addison and Ndikumana 2001). Second,
Eritrea is unusual among SSA countries in deriving significant revenue from its
diaspora—another benefit of the strong social capital built up during the liberation war
(see Kibreab 2001 on this point).
Improved profitability in SOEs followed their commercialization. The fiscal benefit of
privatization has, however, been comparatively small; estimated at ERN 55 million in
1997, compared to total revenues of ERN 2,043 million and non-tax revenues of ERN
1,063 million in the same year (IMF 1998: 64). Proceeds from privatization over 1990-
98 yielded US$ 2 million in total (World Bank 2000a: 288).
4.4 Economic performance prior to the war
GDP growth resulted from reconstruction and reform—reaching 6.8 and 7.9 per cent in
1996 and 1997 before the start of the new war—but growth is highly variable reflecting
agriculture's vulnerability to drought. In 1995, for example, growth slumped to 2.9 per
cent due to the 1995-96 drought (see Table 1). Eritrea has had some success in
diversifying into manufacturing: therefore the value of manufactured output in 1997
was more than double its 1993 level while the value of agricultural output has remained
roughly static, and its share of GDP has fallen from about 13 per cent at independence
to about 9 per cent in 1997 (IMF 1998: 49).
Inflation has stayed relatively low for a reconstructing economy—consumer price
inflation has averaged less than 10 per cent over the 1990s—which is less than
Mozambique's average of 32 per cent (Table 1).6 This is despite the partial liberalization
of price controls; in 1996 controls for bread, flour, petroleum products and
pharmaceuticals were the only ones remaining (IMF 1996: 2). In any case much of the
4 Total tax revenues were 20 per cent of GDP in 1998, a higher ratio than Ethiopia's 11.7 per cent
(World Bank 2000b). This difference partly reflects the more limited role for external grants in
Eritrea, and therefore the greater need to mobilize domestic revenue than in Ethiopia.
5 The nafka is abbreviated to ERN.
6 Mozambique's average inflation rate for 1991-99 is calculated from World Bank (2000b).11
economy was already operating at market prices prior to decontrol due to the
inadequacy and collapse of the Derg imposed price-control apparatus, so decontrol itself
had little impact on inflation. This was also the case in Ethiopia during the first years of
deregulation and devaluation (Hansson 1995). Moreover, under the currency union,
Eritrea's inflation was kept low by the conservative monetary policy pursued by the
Bank of Ethiopia.
The current account deteriorated over 1995-97 since imports of investment goods
increased as reconstruction stepped up (Table 1). Such a widening of the current
account deficit is normal in reconstructing economies but, in contrast to most other
countries, Eritrea's increased current account deficit was largely financed by remittances
from its diaspora while donor support provided only a small share of the financing
(Table 1). In summary, at the start of 1998 the economy was in reasonably good
shape—certainly better than that of many comparable war-torn countries—and some
economic diversification had been achieved. The government finances were well
managed and inflation was under control.
5 The new war with Ethiopia
On 6 May 1998, fighting broke out between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces in the
disputed border area of the Yirga triangle (sometimes called Badime after the area's
major town). This is not the place to discuss in detail the course of the war or the
successive cease-fires and peace plans brokered (unsuccessfully) by the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) and others, until the cease-fire of June 2000 (see Gilkes and Plaut
1999). Instead, we focus on the war's economic causes, and its likely impact on Eritrea's
development prospects.
Ostensibly, the war began over 390 km2 of barren desert and mountain. But in the
period leading up to May 1998 two economic issues—Eritrea's introduction of the nafka
and Ethiopia's use of the port of Assab—led to a serious deterioration in political
relations. When the nafka was introduced in November 1997, Eritrea took the position
that it should have parity with the birr in bilateral trade. Ethiopia rejected parity as
disadvantageous to its trade and argued that the nafka/birr rate should be market-
determined. With the new currency's introduction, Ethiopia required the settlement of
all its trade with Eritrea in hard currency (except for border trade valued at below 2,000
birr).7 This Ethiopian decision ‘... came as a shock and rebuff to the Eritreans’ (Gilkes
and Plaut 1999: 14).
Eritrea's independence left disputed areas along the 1,000 km Eritrea-Ethiopia border
but neither country felt an urgent need to resolve the issue. The border's existence meant
little to economic life in either country given the currency union and the scale of
bilateral trade. But the nafka's introduction turned the border into a real trade barrier
across which transaction costs were now incurred in the currency conversion. Therefore
the disputed border areas themselves continued to have little economic value, but the
7 Previously, all transactions with Ethiopia, except the imports of spare parts for the Assab refinery and
the purchase of certain exports, were settled in birr (IMF 1998: 36).12
border itself now had tangible economic effects—which were largely negative in the
view of the Ethiopians.
Second, Eritrea's independence left Ethiopia landlocked. But, relations between the two
governments got off to a good start, a free trade pact was signed, and a 1992 agreement
on transit trade established Assab as a free port for Ethiopia (UNDP 1993: 3). With the
nafka's introduction, Ethiopia now had to pay in dollars for the use of the port and this,
together with disagreements over its administration, led Ethiopia to divert an increasing
amount of trade through Djibouti. This hit Eritrean revenues from port fees and charges
which, as we saw in section 3, accounted for 22.6 per cent of total public revenues net
of grants. The port of Assab alone provided some 5 per cent of total government
revenue before the war (EIU 1999a: 25). As relations deteriorated, Ethiopia raised its
tariffs on Eritrean imports.
For an economist it is tempting to ascribe the root causes of the war to economic
factors, and indeed these have a significant role in many conflicts (see for example
research by Collier 1999, Nafziger et al. 2000). Certainly, trade and exchange-rate
issues played a large role in damaging bilateral relations. But it is equally clear that
national pride and other ‘intangible’ factors soured the relationship: the conflict quickly
escalated to a level from which neither side felt able to back away without loss of face.
Moreover, any concessions to the foreign enemy were inevitably seen as signs of
weakness by internal forces willing to challenge the current leaders.
The costs of the war to both countries are numerous. However, objective information is
hard to obtain since both sides have an obvious incentive to spread disinformation. First,
there is the human suffering. By June 2000 casualties on both sides totalled at least
100,000. About 250,000 Eritreans (and 300,000 Ethiopians) have been internally
displaced, and both countries have expelled each other's citizens and confiscated their
property (the Eritrean Relief Commission estimates the number of Eritrean deportees
from Ethiopia at 65,000). Both countries will therefore have to spend large sums (which
they can ill-afford) on resettling affected populations and demobilization, as they did in
the early 1990s (see Daniel Ayalew et al. 1999 and Kibreab 2001).
Furthermore, the war is demanding large amounts of resources from both countries.
Again, data are hard to obtain, both Eritrea and Ethiopia are downplaying the economic
impact of the war, and therefore the credibility of recent statistics is unknown. Eritrea's
defence spending may have jumped to 20 per cent of GDP in 1998 from 9 per cent in
1997 (EIU 1999a), and may have gone as high as 44 per cent (EIU 1999b: 22, citing the
Philadelphia Inquirer of 7 September 1999).
The fiscal deficit (including grants) rose from around 7 per cent of GDP before the war
began to 32 per cent in 1998 (World Bank 1999). The fiscal deterioration largely
resulted from the loss of revenue from port fees and charges, together with the negative
impact of the downturn in domestic economic activity on revenues from indirect taxes
and income taxes. However, a war surtax has been introduced and the diaspora has
stepped up its contributions; the most widely circulated estimate is US$ 400 million but
again this cannot be confirmed (EIU 1999a). This inflow has partly substituted for the
lost tax revenue and has slowed the nafka's depreciation against the dollar since the start
of the war; therefore the diaspora's contributions have contained the war's inflationary
effects—for the moment.13
However, the longer-term macro-economic effects are potentially very serious. Both
sides have spent prodigious sums in the international arms markets and this, combined
with the downturn in exports—which fell by more than 33 per cent in 1998 (World
Bank 1999)—has reduced foreign currency reserves: Eritrea's reserves are down from
seven months import-coverage (their pre-war level) to three months (EIU 1999a: 25).
The current account deficit (before capital grants) stood at about 33 per cent of GDP in
1998 (World Bank 1999). The war will most likely lead to a build up in external
commercial debt—to finance imports as well as arms—and could, in the worst case,
create a serious debt-service problem for the future.
It is obvious that in a situation like this the prospects for economic development are
quite bleak. Preliminary figures for 1998 indicate that real growth dropped from just
below 8 per cent in 1997 to 3 per cent in 1998 (World Bank 1999). The mobilization has
denuded rural communities of labour (some 300,000 Eritreans have been drafted)
thereby reducing agricultural output (although the army has kept agriculture going in
some areas). Drought has compounded the loss of food output. In January 2000, the
UN's humanitarian agencies launched simultaneous appeals for both Eritrea and
Ethiopia. The US$ 42.7 million appeal for Eritrea solicited food and non-food aid for
583,000 people: 372,000 were categorized as war-affected and over 211,000 were
drought affected. With a much larger population, Ethiopia has more people in need of
emergency help (8 million).
Even if the present cease-fire holds—and this is by no means certain—the economic
fallout will be long-lasting. The war has reduced and distorted the regional trade in the
Horn of Africa thereby undoing much of the beneficial economic integration that
occurred in the 1990s. The Horn needs more intra-regional trade if it is to overcome the
constraints of small (and poor) national markets and attract more foreign investment.
But mistrust will damage bilateral trade relations for years, undermining the ability of
countries to develop through trade based on their respective comparative advantages.
Eritrea is searching for new markets in Sudan and the Great Lakes region, but these can
be only partial substitutes for the Ethiopian market. Foreign investment in Eritrea's
infrastructure projects such as power supplies and telecommunications, together with an
aluminium processing plant, is now stalled.
6 Conclusions: from ashes to fire
With the Derg's overthrow in 1991, Eritrea embarked on the construction of a new state.
A Constitution was drawn up and promulgated, and the basis for a participatory political
system was laid out. New economic institutions were created, and considerable reform
undertaken. Problems in co-ordinating reform and reconstruction were largely avoided,
mainly because of the institutional ‘clean slate’ facing the country at independence and
the high level of social solidarity and other social capital that characterize the country.
A well-defined economic strategy, and careful use of aid, promised higher returns to
investment (and fewer unsustainable projects) than found elsewhere in SSA. By the start
of 1998, the country had achieved much in a short time, and the basic structures of a
development state were well-advanced. Some problems were evident—the country had
not yet advanced as far as Mozambique in consolidating democratic institutions—but
optimism about the future prevailed.14
The 1998-2000 war threatens to undermine this achievement. The ashes of the war that
ended in 1991 have reignited in a surprising, and different, way. This paper takes no
position on the respective merits or otherwise of the two belligerents. It is, however,
clear that both have suffered major damage which will be long-lasting. The disruption to
their trade and investment relationships is particularly severe. Moreover, the war
imperils the construction of a development state in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1991,
both had real prospects of achieving this, thereby reversing the misguided and venal
policies of the Derg. But the war has strengthened nationalist forces in both countries
and may endanger further progress in democraticatization. It is to be hoped that Eritrea's
strong social capital can redirect the energies of the state back to development if peace
can truly be secured.
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Eritrea: Basic economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP per capita (US $) .. 132.2 120.5 146.4 160.5 172.0 173.5 167.5 n.a
GNP per capita (US $) .. n.a. n.a. 180.0 180.0 200.0 230.0 200 ..
GDP growth rate (%) .. n.a - 2.5 9.8 2.9 6.7 7.9 3.0 5.0
Exports of goods & services, growth rate (real) (%) .. n.a 64.6 - 8.6 8.6 13.3 4.7 - 33.5 56.9
Inflation (%)
...GDP deflator .. n.a 29.1 22.2 11.3 2.9 2.7 - 0.9 3.8
Consumer Price Index .. n.a 4.6 11.6 10.7 9.3 4.6 7.0 n.a
Gross domestic investment (total) as % of GDP .. 5.4 15.1 17.8 19.2 29.3 40.9 40.9 44.1
Gross private investment as a % of GDP .. 1.8 1.0 7.3 8.2 13.9 22.0 24.0 25.9
Gross public investment as a % of GDP .. 3.6 14.1 10.5 11.1 15.4 18.9 16.9 18.2
Foreign direct investment as a % of GDP .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.9 4.6 ..
.. not applicable
n.a. not available
data for 1999 are estimates
Source: World Bank (2000b)Table 2
Eritrea: external accounts
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(estimated)
Trade balance (US$ million) -239.0 -331.4 -323.2 -418.5 -436.4
Exports (f.o.b) (US$ million) 36.1 64.5 80.6 95.3 53.1
Imports (c.i.f) (US$ million) 275.1 395.9 403.8 513.7 489.5
Private transfers (net) (US$ million) 165.4 276.3 215.3 243.9 384.4
Current account (excluding official transfers) (US$ million) 28.4 17.9 -53.2 -130.7 -36.5
Current account (excluding official transfers) as a percentage of GNP 5.6 2.7 -7.7 -17.2 -4.4
Current account (including official transfers as a percentage of GNP) 19.4 14.7 2.6 -6.7 0.6
Official transfers (net) (US$ million) 69.5 79.7 71.0 79.9 41.4
Official transfers (net) (as percentage of GNP) 13.8 12.0 10.3 10.5 5.0
Stock of External Debt (US$ million) 2.4 31.6 39.1 47.2 75.6
Stock of External Debt (as percentage of GNP) 0.5 4.8 5.7 6.2 9.1
Source: IMF (1998: 76), and author's calculations.Table 3
Eritrea: fiscal position 1992-99 (percentage of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fiscal Balance inc. Grants % of GDP - 3.2 - 6.4 - 12.7 - 22.4 - 19.8 - 7.0 - 32.4 n.a
Fiscal Balance excl. Grants % of GDP - 12.3 - 26.5 - 31.2 - 35.1 - 31.7 - 13.2 - 38.4 n.a
Capital grants as % of GDP 9.1 20.1 18.5 12.7 12.0 6.2 5.9 0.0
Revenue, incl. all Grants % of GDP 33.4 55.4 46.6 46.8 44.2 47.9 39.8 ..
Expenditure, as % of GDP 36.7 61.8 59.3 69.2 64.0 54.9 72.2 ..
Note: 1998 and 1999 numbers are estimates.
Private remittances from overseas contribute to a large portion of Eritrea's income. Therefore, ratios to GNP are more appropriate measures to GDP. In contrast, most
SSA countries receive much smaller private remittance flows, and therefore ratios to GDP are appropriate for much of SSA. The World Bank reports fiscal data as
ratios to GDP for all countries. IMF (1998: Table 14) provides some fiscal data as ratios to GNP, but does not cover all the fiscal indicators provided by the World
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